To explore this debate about the link between productivity and industrial relations this study examines trends in the Queensland coal sector since 2001, drawing upon statistics for production and employment provided to it by both the Rent and Statistics Unit (R&S) and the Mine Safety and Health Unit (S&H) of the Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines (QDNRM); statistics that supplement those publicly available. Significantly, in the 1990s the Queensland coal industry seemed to provide strong evidence for the view that reducing union influence and centralized wage fixation provisions advanced productivity. Whereas, nationally, labour productivity advanced at 3.2 per cent per year between 1993-93 and 1998-99 , in the Queensland coal industry it rose at an annualized rate of 17.6 per cent between 1995-96 and 2000-01. This saw per capita saleable output rise from 8830 tonnes to 16,579 tonnes per annum (Joint Coal Board and QDNRM, 2001: xx) . Back then, one of the authors of this study concluded, in an article appearing in this journal (Bowden, 2000: 376) , that 'a new work regime' had been established in coal mining, 'characterised by increased managerial control, increased work intensity, dramatic gains in productivity.' Yet, if this 'new work regime' was initially associated with rising productivity, in the ensuing decade an accentuation of this same regime produced falls in labour productivity that more than reversed all the previous gains. In short, the apparent link between industrial relations change and productivity in this industry turned out to be a chimera. As this study will indicate, between 2001-02 and 2011-12 annual saleable output per employee collapsed, falling by 67.9 per cent (QDNRM, 2002; QDNRM, 2013a) . This left annual output per employee at 5323 tonnes -far less than that obtained in 1996. If we measure labour productivity on the basis of employment statistics collected by the QDNRM's Safety and Health Unit, which more accurately gauge both contractor and direct employee engagements, an even worse trend is revealed with annual output per employee falling to only 4455 tonnes (QDNRM-S&H, 2013a) . Similar trends are found when, again using statistics from QDNRM's Safety and Health Unit, we examine outcomes at four large Central Queensland open-cut mines (QDNRM-S&H, 2013b ).
The stark productivity declines which this study records leads inevitably to two questions. The first is: How can we explain these falls, given that the industrial relations settings in the industry werefor most if not all of the post-2001 period -more favourable to employers than they had been in the years between 1996 and 2000, when productivity rose sharply? The answer to this conundrum is not to be found, this study argues, in factors such as increased overburden and declining resource quality identified by the Production Commission Topp et al., 2008) . Instead, the only correlation that seems to hold true is that between the productivity and the state of the labour market. Since 1996, on every occasion that productivity rose (1996-2000 and 2011-2013) , employment was falling.
Conversely, when employment rose (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , productivity fell. Suggestively, rising employment was always associated with rising coal prices, while falling employment was always correlated with declining price. This coincidence of product and labour market circumstance meant that in times of falling price employers had both incentive and means (in the form of surplus labour) to enact changes that extracted greater labour effort from their workforce. Conversely, in times of rising price they had not only less means for taking action but also less incentive. The second question to present itself is: why did the employers not take actions to remedy the fall in productivity that must have become apparent to them by the mid-2000s? To this, two answers are provided. As indicated in Table 3 of this paper, declining physical outputs per employee were for most of the 2001 to 2011 period more than offset by rising prices, so that the value of the coal produced per person kept rising even though the amount rendered fell. The second answer to the question is that in coal mining, as in other industries, productivity often plays second fiddle to other factors. If the coal industry has failed to find a magic productivity elixir, a profound recasting of industrial relations has nevertheless occurred. At heart, it is argued, this involved a systematic employer attempt to overcome the social consequences that have followed from geologically-fixed supply, a factor that has historically manifested itself in strong community support for coal mining unions (Kerr and Siegel, 1954; Gollan, 1963) . In consequence, decollectivization rather than productivity enhancement remained the constant. Since 2001, it is suggested, this involved two employer strategies. First, between 2001 and 2011, coal operators continued to displace the unionized workforce with contractors -a practice that was well in place before 2000 (Bowden, 2004; Waring, 2003) . More recently, it has involved the introduction of a Fly-in, Fly-Out (FIFO) workforce into the Queensland industry, a practice that allows employers to circumvent not only the remnants of the unionized workforce but also the coal communities that have provided past sustenance to this workforce. The success of both gambits is indicated by the fact that union density in coal mining declined from 75.5 per cent to 39.8 per cent between 2001 (ABS, 2002 ABS, 2014: 14) .
Industrial Relations in Coal Mining: Markets, Productivity and Place
The relationship between productivity and industrial relations has become an increasingly contentious one for Australian public policy. In the early 2000s, the correlation between major industrial relations changes (enterprise bargaining, the introduction of the WRA) and the 1990s 'productivity surge' was widely seen as causation (see Parham, 2013 , for summary of this literature). However, the productivity 'surge' of the 1990s was followed by a marked 'productivity slump ' between 2003 ' between -04 and 2011 ' between -12 (Parham, 2013 . This 'slump' lent support to those such as Peetz (2006 Peetz ( , 2012 and Hancock (2012; Hancock et al., 2007) who argued that there is no intrinsic relationship between productivity and industrial relations, and that there are instead both 'high' and 'low' roads to increased productivity, the latter involving increased skill and employment involvement and the latter greater work intensity and job insecurity. In discounting the supposed long-term benefits of the 1990s 'surge', Hancock (2012: 296) also contended that -to the extent a positive relationship did exist between productivity growth and policy changes during the 1990s -it was due to the picking of 'low-hanging fruit'. Once picked, scope for further advances was largely exhausted. Peetz (2006 Peetz ( , 2012 and Hancock (2012; Hancock et., 2007) also emphasize that there was, in fact, no uniform productivity 'surge' across the economy between 1993-94 and 1998-99. Instead, the national result reflected widely varying occurrences in a range of industries with the balance favouring above-trend growth only because of aberrant rises in particular industries (mining being one).
There is no doubt that recent trends in the Australian economy have curtailed support for simplistic linkages between productivity and industrial relations. In a recent study, Dean Parham (2013: 470) a former Productivity Commission staffer, conceded that: 'Productivity cannot be turned on like a tap.' Strong support remains, however, for the view that a labour relations environment that imposes few restrictions on management is most conducive to productivity advancement (Productivity Commission, 2009 Parham, 2004 Parham, , 2009 . The Productivity Commission, in particular, continues to argue that 'the unprecedented productivity growth' of the 1990s stemmed from 'enabling' policy, and that future gains will necessarily be associated with further labour market deregulation (Productivity Commission, 2009: xiv-xv; also Productivity Commission, 2013) . Unfortunately for the holders of such opinion, trends in Australian mining have become increasingly problematic. In the 1990s, this industry was subject to particularly radical industrial relations change. The iron ore industry was largely deunionized (Ellem, 2002 (Ellem, , 2004 . As will be discussed in more detail below, the coal industry also experienced profound change once the Coal Industry Tribunal (CIT), which had previously provided the sector with regulatory oversight, was abolished in 1995; an event followed in the ensuing year by the election of the Howard Government and the passage of the WRA. With job numbers slashed, saleable output per employee in Queensland rose from 8830 tonnes to 16,579 tonnes per annum between 1995 -96 and 2000 -01 (Joint Coal Board & QDNRM, 2001 . Such outcomes caused a Business Council of Australia study (2005: 25) to declare that the 'mining sector provides a clear and excellent example of the benefits of workplace reform.' However, since 2000 the mining sector has experienced productivity declines that are among the worst of any industry (Dolman, 2009: 249) . Outcomes were particularly poor in coal mining, where a Productivity Commission study (Topp et al., 2008: 26) concluded that labour productivity declined at an annualized rate of 4.2 per cent in the six years after 2000-01. To explain these outcomes a number of Productivity Commission studies (Topp et al., 2008; Productivity Commission, 2009 suggested that further advances in mining were being 'masked' by 'resource depletion' (i.e. greater extraction difficulties) and labour allocation to new capital projects, an opinion shared by a number of independent studies (Dolman, 2009; Parham, 2013) .
The view that mining productivity is affected by geological factors reflects a more nuanced one than that found earlier in the Production Commission (1998) Inquiry into the coal industry and a series of studies emanating from Flinders University's National Institute for Labour Studies (Wooden, Robertson and Cernaz, 1996; Wooden and Robertson, 1997; Hawke and Robertson, 1999) . These held a diminution of union influence and a resort to individual bargaining were a guarantor of sustained productivity increases. While this study will later return to the impact of geological factors on recent coal mining productivity trends, the point to be made here is that in coal mining increased productivity does not always lead to greater prosperity. On the contrary, the reverse often applies. To understand this quandary requires consideration of the three interrelated factors that are arguably the key determinants of coal mining industrial relations: difficulty in providing employee supervision, a tendency towards over-capacity, and the social consequences that stem from geologically fixed supply. Of these three factors, the first relates most directly to productivity given the inherent difficulties in providing direct supervision in either underground labyrinths or the vast spaces of opencut mines (Mauldon, 1929 , Beaumont, 1975 Turner, 1982) . It is, however, the relationship between productivity and the industry's tendency to over-supply product markets that has historically been the main source of tension. As Mauldon (1929: 152) long ago observed, when prices rise new firms enter the trade 'in a lottery which promises … to give prizes to all.' When prices fall, newcomers stay rather than amortize investments, exacerbating cyclical imbalances. In these circumstances, increased productivity and output tends to both curtail the length of any boom while exacerbating the detrimental effects of price decline. Two main employee responses to this problem have been identified (Clegg, Fox and Thompson, 1964; Gollan, 1963; Turner, 1982) . First, by forming unions, employees fought to maintain a floor under wages during periods of falling price. Second, they have historically sought to limit output. At the mine-site level, this involved the imposition of union demarcation lines and individual output restrictions. At an industry-level, unions supported those employers who formed selling cartels or Vends; bodies that sought price maximization through regulated output. What gave union responses force was that the prosperity of entire communities was linked to their efforts, producing what has been described as a 'combative self-consciousness' among geographically distinct coal communities (Mauldon, 1927: 75) . Indeed, it is the opinion of virtually every industry study that it is unionism's communal basis that primarily differentiates industrial relations in coal mining from that found elsewhere (Kerr and Siegal, 1954; Gollan, 1963; Williams, 1981) . This outcome is, in turn, the result of the third dimension to coal mining industrial relations, the social consequences of geologically fixed supply. While the location of all mining is so determined, coal mining differs in that the value of the extracted commodity is low. In consequence, coal mining normally only occurs when deposits can be worked for long periods, giving coal communities unusual longevity and homogeneity.
Significantly, the study of geography and space has increasingly assumed a central role in mainstream industrial relations. Rather than simply envisioning place as fixed and static, researchers (Herod, 2012; Ellem and Shields, 1999; Ellem and McGrath-Champ, 2012 ) have come to regard community relationships as contested, shaped by market relationships and labour strategies as well as by personal bonds. If there is one single thing that differentiates the current era of industrial relations in Australian mining from earlier periods it is not the pursuit of enhanced productivity, but rather the managerial reshaping of community-based relationships. Whereas previously employers dealt with the consequences of the 'combative self-consciousness' found in mining communities, in the present they are dealing directly with the source of their past grief. In researching the Pilbara iron ore industry -an industry supplying the same markets as Queensland's coal industry and dominated by many of the same companies - Ellem (2006: 378) observes that 'arguments about place marked the companies' strategies and labor's responses at every step.' If union avoidance and greater control are the incentives for action, the means for social transformation are provided by improved transport and longer shift rotations. Prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), this transformation was arguably more complete in the iron ore industry, where company organized FlFO employment prevailed (Ellem, 2003 (Ellem, , 2006 . By contrast, the well-studied growth of a Drive-in, Drive-out (DIDO) workforce in Central Queensland (Di Milia and Bowden, 2007; Murray and Peetz, 2010; Peetz and Murray, 2011) was an informal rather than a company-directed process, albeit one driven by changed job circumstance.
Many of those who commuted from the coast were workers with established ties to the historic coal communities; communities within which many families were migrants from the southern underground sector. The recent decisions of producers such as BHP Billiton to not only utilize FIFO employment but to also avoid recruiting from Central Queensland, therefore, represents not an alteration of industrial relations practice but rather a fundamental recasting.
Methodological Issues
With the exception of those used for union density, this study's statistics are drawn from (QDNRM-S&H, 2013a ). But discrepancy is also found in earlier data (see Table 1 ).
It is the QDNRM's opinion that, of the two sets, those recorded for 'safety' purposes are more reliable (QDNRM, 2013c) . Nevertheless, labour productivity (i.e. per capita overburden removed, per capita raw coal output, per capita saleable coal output) is calculated on the basis of both data sets. In carrying out such calculations, published production figures are supplemented by statistics on overburden removal provided by QDNRM's Rent and Statistics Unit (QDNRM-R&S). standard. This means that miners invariably work more annual hours than they did prior to 1996, when an eight-hour day prevailed. However, given the post-2001 focus of our study, a longer working day will be assumed to be the norm. When comparing current levels of productivity with earlier periods, however, the disparity in working hours needs to be borne in mind.
Background: Booms and Busts, 1996-2013
In Queensland's export coal industry the general tendency towards over-capacity has manifested itself in extreme form. Not only are operations incomparably larger in scale than previous endeavours, they are also now exposed to the vagaries of far distant markets. Admittedly, Queensland benefits from the fact that most of its coal is of the coking (metallurgical) variety used in steel making, a product which historically traded at a 30 to 40 per cent premium to thermal coal. Despite this boon, however, by the early 1980s increased exports were already adversely affecting price. After peaking at US$59.04 in 1982, the average nominal FOB price for Australian coking coal declined to US$31.64
per tonne in 2000 (Bowden, 2012: 24) 1 . These falls underpinned a marked shift in employer behaviour as they began to focus more rigorously on costs. Between 1987 and 1995, given the regulatory oversight of the CIT, this involved a series of union-negotiated industry agreements and 'work models' that linked wages to skill levels (Barry, Bowden and Brosnan, 1988 Direct employment fell from 6,665 to 3,954 (Bowden, 2004: 504) . Table 2 ). Unlike the price spike that followed the GFC, this boom Table 2 ). Chinese developments explain this good fortune. Whereas China was a net exporter in As prices rose and fell in the period after 1996, so too did productivity, albeit in inverse relationship to both price and employment. In other words, since 1996 rising productivity has been temporally associated with periods of job contraction. Conversely, labour market expansion is correlated with productivity declines. In exploring such trends this study now turns to an analysis of labour productivity at both an industry and mine-site level.
Industry Productivity Trends
As noted earlier, both the Productivity Commission (Topp et al, 2008; Estimations of the effect of increased overburden are also problematic. Certainly it is true that the shifting of overburden is a barrier to labour productivity in mining, which has historically been understood as the ratio between raw or saleable coal output and the number of workers engaged.
Nevertheless, a mine's capacity to efficiently extract coal is dependent upon its capacity to shift overburden. If we are to accept the argument (Topp et al., 2007; Productivity Commission, 2009 Parham, 2004 ) that increased overburden is 'masking' otherwise rising productivity, we would logically expect that the amount of overburden being moved per worker would be increasing. This is particularly so given technological gains. The Caterpillar 797F dump trucks introduced at the BHP Mitsubishi Alliance (BMA) pits, for example, had a 400 tonne capacity, 140 tonnes more than the previous generation (Tasker, 2013a: 23) . In Figure 1 , we test to see whether this occurred by dividing 
Mine-site Productivity Trends, 2007 to 2012
The In explaining the increase in contractor numbers across our four mines we firstly note the extent to which core activities, previously the domain of employee miners, were out-sourced. This entrenched a practice the beginnings of which were observed by Waring in the early 2000s (Waring, 2003) . At Mine D, the largest of the four mines, slightly over half the contractor workforce (685 out of 1,333) were employed by a single contractor, Downer EDI, whose workforce operated both drill and blast services and seven truck-shovel fleets at Mine D's pre-strip operation. For Downer EDI, which was also a contractor at Mine A, its contract at Mine D was its largest in eastern Australia, being valued at more than $400 million per year (Downer EDI, 2013; Macnamara, 2013: 20; Garvey, 2013: 19) . At Mine C, overburden removal was also largely contracted out, this time to Leighton Contractors.
By 2012 Leighton's permanent workforce at Mine C stood at 260 (Leighton, 2013a) . In 2008, Leighton
Contractors also secured a $264 million extension of an overburden removal contract at Mine B (Leighton, 2013b) . Subsequently, Mine B pre-stripping passed to HSE, which by 2013 was employing 360 permanent workers on-site -39.8 per cent of the mine's contract workforce (HSE Group, 2013).
As we discuss further below, increased engagement of contractors by coal operators was primarily undertaken as part of a long-term strategy directed towards the circumvention of the unionized workforce. Any managerial hopes that this would also deliver a productivity boom proved misplaced. Forced to compete in the same labour market as the mining companies themselves, there is little to indicate that contractors and their employees were either more or less productive or more or less cost effective than employee miners. As one observer (Fitzgerald, 2013: 24) noted, by 2012 it was widely considered that the cost advantage of contractors was 'pretty much ... zero.' As coal prices waned after 2011, so too did coal owner enthusiasm for contractors. In May 2013, BHP Billiton executive, Gideon Oberholzer, informed analysts that his company intended 'a reduction in contractor usage' (Tasker, 2013b: 18) . This shift is also evident at our four mines, which saw employee miners recoup a 19.4 per cent share of the four-mine workforce between 2010-11 and 2012-13.
Recasting Industrial Relations
If we look solely at the issue of productivity, then the years since 2001 stand in marked contrast to the previous decade. Whereas productivity more than doubled between 1991 and 2001 in a job market characterized by first static and then falling employment, the ensuing decade saw saleable output per employee fall to less than a third of the 2001 peak in the context of rapid labour force expansion. The experience of these latter years therefore cautions against assumptions, forcefully advocated by the Productivity Commission (1998, 2009, 2013) , that a labour relations environment that imposes less restrictions on management is a guarantor of higher productivity. Until 1 Westfarmers' Curragh North that gave work to another 240 (Thiess, 2013) . As has been well documented (Peetz and Murray, 2011; Di Milia and Bowden, 2007) , the growth of outsourcing and longer shift rosters was widely associated with the emergence of a DIDO workforce as many workers opted to base themselves in adjacent coastal communities rather than mining townships. However, even though an estimated 40 per cent of the Central Queensland coal workforce was commuting to and from the coast by 2011 (BMA, 2011:19) , there is nothing to suggest that this resulted from deliberate managerial strategy. Instead, mine operators developed an agnostic attitude to the DIDO phenomenon. Whether one became a DIDO worker, or remained a permanent resident, was a matter of individual choice -albeit one influenced by changed employment circumstance. 
Conclusion
In 2001, few could have predicted the events that were to transpire in the Queensland coal industry in the ensuing thirteen years. Given that the decade and a half preceding 2001 had been characterized by falling coal prices, declining employment, rising productivity and an increasingly embittered relationship between the coal unions and employers, a continuation of all these established trends then seemed the most likely outcome. How then, in 2014, are
we to make sense of not only the last 13 years but of the entire last quarter century in ways that allow prediction of the likely future path of industrial relations in this industry? The key to this conundrum is to look beyond the surface movements to comprehend the underlying currents that have always characterized coal mining. At this deeper level, we have argued, three key factors are at play: the difficulty of supervising employees in coal mines, a tendency to over-supply product markets and the social consequences of geologically-fixed supply. With regard to the first of these, supervision of coal miners, the events of the last 25 years in general, and the last 13 years in particular, suggest it is far easier to extract increased labour productivity in a falling job market than a rising one. Since 1996, when both coal prices and employment have fallen (1996-2001 and 2011-2013) , productivity has risen.
Conversely, when employment and coal prices rose (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , productivity fell. The only partial exception to this rule applies to the situation that prevailed during the era when workplace change occurred within a union-negotiated framework (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) . During this period, employment stagnated rather than fell. Even this era was, however, characterized by increasingly insecure employment with marked annual fluctuations. By contrast, it is difficult to ascertain any clear link between increased labour productivity and industrial relations practices. Since the mid-1980s, rising productivity has been associated with unionnegotiated 'work models ' (1987-1995) as well as periods when employers resorted to individual bargaining and increased utilization of contractors (1996-2001 and 2011-2013 ).
Yet the latter practices were also associated with the long period of declining productivity (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . We can thus conclude that the state of the labour market is the best indicator of likely trends in labour productivity.
The second thing that we can conclude is that there is no causal link between increased productivity and industry prosperity. On the contrary, the pattern evident over the last 25 years suggests that rather than it being the case that increased productivity creates prosperity, it would appear that industry prosperity drives falling productivity. When prices rose dramatically after 2001, employers promptly abandoned interest in productivity, happily increasing employment for relatively modest output gains.
While price, productivity and prosperity have risen and fallen over recent decades, the one constant has been employer campaigns to circumvent the consequences of only the unionized workforce but also the coal mining communities. While the outcome of this strategy cannot be foreseen, the one thing that we can predict is that it will only be associated with increased productivity during times of labour market shrinkage.
